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Abstract 
Must policymakers seeking to replicate the success of Silicon Valley’s venture 
capital market first replicate other US institutions, such as deep and liquid stock 
markets?  Or  can  legal  reforms  alone  make  a  significant  difference?  In  this 
paper,  we  compare  the  economic  and  legal  determinants  of  venture  capital 
investment,  fundraising  and  exits.  We  introduce  a  cross-sectional  and  time 
series empirical analysis across 15 countries and 13 years of data spanning an 
entire business cycle. We show that the legal environment matters as much as 
the strength of stock markets; that government programmes more often hinder 
than help the development of private equity, and that temperate bankruptcy laws 
stimulate  entrepreneurial  demand  for  venture  capital.  Our  results  provide 
generalizable lessons for legal reform. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
An  important  question  for  the  industrial  policymakers  around  the  world  is: 
“how  do  we  replicate  the  success  phenomenon  of  Silicon  Valley’s 
entrepreneurialism  and  venture  capital  finance?”
1  Whilst  Silicon  Valley’s 
success is surely a multi-faceted story, one key to its dynamism appears to be 
the  use  of  venture  capital,  a  form  of  financial  intermediation  that  seems 
particularly well-matched to the development of innovative, high-tech products. 
Understanding the way in which venture capital operates, and the economic, 
institutional and legal factors that help it to flourish, is therefore an important 
question for research.  
 
The  structure  of  venture  capital  investment  has  in  recent  years  received 
considerable attention.
2 Several studies have shown that levels of venture capital 
investment in the US are responsive to changes in a range of legal and fiscal 
variables,  including  pension  fund  regulation,  taxes  and  subsidies.
3  However, 
less work has been done on investigating its determinants across countries. The 
principal  proposition  established  in  the  literature  is  that  venture  capital 
flourishes  in  countries  with  deep  and  liquid  stock  markets  (Gompers,  1998; 
Gompers  and  Lerner,  1998,  1999,  2001;  Black  and  Gilson,  1998;  Jeng  and 
Wells, 2000; Lerner, 1999, 2002a). This would seem to imply that policymakers 
seeking  to  develop  venture  capital  markets  might  be  best  to  focus  upon 
developing national stock markets, rather than seek to stimulate venture capital 
directly. A subsidiary proposition established in the literature reinforces this: 
that direct subsidies, or government-controlled venture capital funds, intended 
to  ‘seed’  private  equity  industries,  have  in  many  cases  been  failures.  This 
implies  that  for  policymakers  who  wish  to  promote  venture  capital  in  the 
absence of stock markets, the engineering task is a tall order (Lerner, 2002b; 
Gilson, 2003). 
 
In this paper, we build upon this prior work by considering how law matters for 
venture capital finance. The paper begins by surveying the existing literature 
and formulating several hypotheses for the way in which different aspects of 
law might impact upon the supply of, and demand for, venture capital finance. 
We then test these hypotheses empirically, using a methodology that identifies 
the effect of legal variables whilst controlling for economic factors, and also 
allows  for  comparisons  of  the  relative  importance  of  economic  and  legal 
variables for the level of venture capital investment.  
 
We employ a cross-sectional and time series empirical analysis across an entire 
business  cycle—the  years  1990  to  2002—of  data  drawn  from  15  Western 
European and North American countries.
4 Our dependent variables are drawn   2
from trade association data, compared relative to national GDP.
5 Our primary 
focus  is  on  levels  of  investment  by  venture  capital  funds  in  entrepreneurial 
firms. Using simultaneous equations methods, we distinguish those independent 
variables that affect the supply of investment funds from venture capitalists to 
entrepreneurial firms, those that affect the demand for equity finance by such 
firms,  and  variables  that  affect  both  supply  and  demand.  In  so  doing  we 
distinguish  between  early  stage,  expansion  stage  and  total  private  equity 
investment.
6  Whilst  ‘early  stage’  investment  is  most  closely  related  to  new 
business start-up and hence of most interest to policymakers seeking to foster a 
‘start-up’ culture, we study these different sectors of investment both separately 
and  together  in  order  to  consider  the  robustness  of  the  results  to  different 
definitions of venture capital and private equity. To cross-check our results, we 
also analyse data for fundraising by venture capitalists and private equity funds 
from their end-investors, and exits by such funds from their investee firms.  
 
Like earlier studies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Jeng and Wells, 2000), our 
empirical  results  show  that  economic  factors  are  important  determinants  of 
venture  capital  investment.  As  might  be  expected,  stock  market  conditions, 
particularly over the bubble period in 1999 and 2000, significantly impacted 
both  the  supply  of  and  demand  for  venture  capital.  We  also  show,  again 
consistently with expectations, that a nation’s levels of entrepreneurial activity 
(as  represented  by  self-employment  rates)  and  ‘idea’  generation  (patent 
applications) are significant determinants of demand for venture capital finance. 
 
This paper’s contribution, however, lies in the findings relating to the role of 
legal  variables.  We  consider  first  whether,  in  a  general  sense,  the  legal 
environment does ‘matter’ for venture capital finance. Previous literature has 
tended  to  employ  ‘law  and  finance’  variables  specified  by  reference  to 
investment  in  public  companies,  rather  than  the  particular  needs  of  venture 
capitalists. For the first time, we employ an index of legal and fiscal variables 
that  pertain  specifically  to  factors  considered  important  by  a  leading  trade 
association, the European Venture Capital Association (‘EVCA’). If law does 
‘matter’, then we would expect favourable rankings on EVCA’s index to be 
correlated to higher levels of venture capital investment. Our empirical findings 
show that the EVCA index of the ‘investor friendliness’ of country’s legal and 
fiscal environment is a significant determinant of the supply of venture capital 
investment to entrepreneurial firms, and also of fundraising and exit activity by 
venture capitalists.  
 
Secondly,  we  revisit  the  question  of  the  impact  of  government  investment 
designed to ‘seed’ private venture capital finance. Whilst it is possible that such 
programs  may  be  successful  in  their  aim  of  ‘jump  starting’  venture  capital   3
markets,  poorly-designed  public programs  may  waste  government  funds,  or, 
worse  still,  compete  with  private  funds  for  the  same  investments  thereby 
‘crowding out’ the very investments they are seeking to promote. In this paper, 
we  investigate  the  impact  of  publicly  funded  venture  capital  programs  on 
aggregate levels of venture capital investment and fundraising. We find that the 
introduction of significant publicly sponsored programs is actually associated 
with a reduction of the overall level of investment by venture capital and private 
equity firms, even after accounting for the possible endogeneity of government 
programs to low national levels of venture capital activity.
7 We similarly find 
that the presence of such programs has a negative impact on overall levels of 
fundraising by venture capitalists and private equity funds, and also on total 
value of exits by such funds from their investments, suggesting that government 
programs  have  impeded  overall  industry  profitability  in  the  15  countries 
studied. These findings are consistent with the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis, and 
suggest  that  the  appropriate  ‘engineering’  of  government  programs  so  as  to 




Thirdly, we focus on the role of bankruptcy law, hitherto ignored in the venture 
capital literature. It seems at first counterintuitive that bankruptcy law might 
matter. Venture-backed companies have few or no liquid assets. This implies 
that their ‘bankruptcy’ will be a non-event, and hence that the configuration of a 
nation’s corporate bankruptcy law is unlikely to make much difference to its 
venture capitalists. Furthermore, as entrepreneurs enjoy the benefit of limited 
liability through incorporation, personal bankruptcy law might also appear to be 
irrelevant.  We  suggest  that  these  common  intuitions  overlook  the  potential 
impact of personal bankruptcy law at a point in time that is very significant for 
the formulation of the demand function: that is, the ‘pre-seed’ stage—before an 
entrepreneur obtains venture funding. Until this point, entrepreneurs will often 
rely upon their personal funds and credit, thereby creating a risk of personal 
bankruptcy.  
 
The ‘severity’ of the consequences of personal bankruptcy—most importantly 
whether or not a ‘fresh start’ is available and, if so, after what time—might 
therefore be expected to have an impact on demand for venture capital. The 
absence  of  a  fresh  start  would  not  only  deter  marginal  entrepreneurs  from 
‘taking the leap’ ex ante, but will also prevent some inframarginal entrepreneurs 
for whom an earlier idea has ended in failure from ever returning to a nation’s 
talent pool. Our empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis. We show 
that  countries  with  more  ‘severe’  personal  bankruptcy  laws,  measured  by 
reference to the number of years before a bankrupt individual would obtain a   4
‘fresh start’ and controlling for countries in which no fresh start is available, 
have significantly lower demand for venture capital and private equity.   
 
In addition to showing the significance of the foregoing legal variables whilst 
controlling  for  economic  factors,  our  results  also  allow  us  to  compare  their 
relative significance. A particularly striking result is therefore that the EVCA 
index,  a  composite of  various legal  and fiscal indicators, is  as significant a 
determinant  of  venture  capital  and  private  equity  investment  as  economic 
factors such as stock market returns. This suggests that much development of 
venture  capital  markets  may  be  achieved  through  purely  technical  legal 
measures. More specifically, the finding implies to policymakers that the road 
to establishing a Silicon Valley-like venture capital market outside the U.S. is 
paved  with  favourable  tax  laws  and  legal  structures  that  accommodate  the 
establishment of venture capital funds, temperate bankruptcy laws that provide 
little or no time to discharge for entrepreneurs, and at most only a very small 
scope for direct government investment programs.  
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  brief 
description  of  the structure  of  venture  capital  finance,  explains  why  it  is of 
interest  to  academics  and  policymakers,  and  reviews  literature  on  its 
determinants. We develop three hypotheses in section 3, relating respectively to 
the general legal environment (as measured by the EVCA index), the direct 
investment  of  government  funds,  and  the  ‘severity’  of  personal  bankruptcy 
laws. Section 4 describes our dataset, and the empirical methods are explained 
in  section  5.  Section  6  sets  out  our  results,  and  Section  7  explains  their 
implications. 
2.  Venture capital and its determinants  
Venture capital is a subset of private equity investment, distinguished by the 
fact that funds are advanced to businesses that are starting up or at an early 
stage in their development—that is, before a profit has been earned. Venture 
capitalists  are  active  investors,  ameliorating  agency  problems  between 
themselves and their portfolio companies by developing specialist expertise and 
using sophisticated  contractual  terms  designed both to give the  entrepreneur 
appropriate  incentives  and  to  give  the  investor  a  significant  role  in  the 
governance of the firm.
9 Venture capitalists will hold their investments for a 
period of around 3-7 years, during which time they will provide ‘hands on’ 
governance and business advice. Successful investments are exited either by 
listing the company through an initial public offering (IPO), or by selling the 
company  to  a  competitor  (a  ‘trade  sale’).  Unsuccessful  investments  are 
liquidated. One good investment can earn enough to cancel out ten write-offs   5
and still generate a healthy portfolio return. Venture capitalists are themselves 
financial intermediaries, raising their investment funds from end-investors, the 
most  important  of  which  are  institutional  investors.  Complex  contractual 
provisions are again used to resolve agency problems between end-investors 
and venture fund managers (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  
 
Venture capital markets are of particular interest to policy makers because this 
type  of  investment is typically  used to  fund  ‘high-tech’  companies with the 
potential and ambition to grow rapidly. It is thought to be of disproportionate 
importance  in  stimulating  innovation.
10  ‘Start-up’  firms  developing  new 
technologies commonly do not generate steady cash flows that can be used to 
make interest payments, and lack liquid assets that could be used as collateral.
11 
Instead, the value (if any) of a start-up firm will inhere in the ideas and ‘human 
capital’ of the entrepreneur and opportunities for growth. This makes such firms 
unsuitable  candidates  for  debt  investment  (see  e.g.  Berger  and  Udell,  1998; 
Carpenter  and  Petersen,  2002).  Rather,  there  is  a  strong  complementarity 
between ‘soft’ assets and concentrated equity finance, in the form of venture 
capital. This is evidenced by empirical findings that equity (venture capital), 
and not debt, financing, predominates in privately-held ‘high-tech’ firms (Freear 
and Wetzel, 1990; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  
 
Understanding the determinants of VC finance is an important research question 
from  the  perspectives  of  both  policymakers  and  academics.  The  orthodox 
wisdom  suggests  that  economic  and  institutional  variables—in  particular, 
economic  growth,  size  and  liquidity  of  stock  markets  and  returns  to  stock 
market investments—are probably the most important determinants. First, and 
most obviously, venture capital investment levels both across time and across 
countries (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Jeng and Wells, 2000), closely tracking 
business cycles in the economy generally.  
 
Theory and evidence also indicates a strong link between size and liquidity of a 
nation’s stock markets, and the size of its VC investment market (Black and 
Gilson, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000). Stock markets facilitate ‘exit’ from VC 
investment  through  IPOs.  Black  and  Gilson  (1998)  argue  that  the  potential 
availability  of  an  IPO  allows  for  an  implicit  contract  between  VC  and 
entrepreneur that is uniquely compatible with both sets of incentives. The VC 
promises, if the company performs well, to exit via an IPO, an event that will 
simultaneously  return  wealth  to  investors  and  control  to  entrepreneurs.  In 
contrast, a ‘trade sale’ will not return control to the entrepreneur, and if this is 
expected at the outset to be the only form of profitable exit for the VC, the 
entrepreneur’s  incentives  will  be  diluted.  That  said,  the  ability  to  offer  the 
entrepreneur  the  ‘carrot’  of  regaining  control  depends  not  only  upon  the   6
possibility of an IPO, but on the ownership of the company’s shares thereafter 
being dispersed, as in an ‘arm’s length’ financial system.  
 
Where  stock  markets  are  dominated  by  ‘relationship’  finance,  ownership  of 
publicly traded shares will tend to be concentrated in the hands of blockholders, 
meaning that entrepreneur-managers will not be free of investor control.
12 If we 
conclude these factors are the most significant determinants of venture capital 
finance, it seems that venture capital finance must be thought of as being closely 
associated  with  ‘arm’s  length’  financial  systems  (Black  and  Gilson,  1998). 
Moreover, the question of how to stimulate a venture capital market in systems 
without deep and liquid stock markets becomes one of ‘chicken and egg’. It is 
necessary to solve what Gilson (2003) terms the ‘simultaneity’ problem—that 
capital, venture capitalists, and entrepreneurs must be present simultaneously in 
order  for  a  thriving  market  to  develop:  a  formidably  difficult  engineering 
problem.   
 
However, a related literature suggests that legal and regulatory variables may 
also  be  determinants  of  VC  investment.  From  a  policy  perspective,  these 
questions  are  of  particular  interest,  as  they  offer  the  potential  promise  of  a 
technical mechanism for engineering a venture capital market. In theory, a range 
of legal and regulatory factors could impact upon the supply of, and demand 
for,  venture  capital  finance  (see  e.g.  Kanniainen  and  Keuschnigg,  2003a,b; 
Keuschnigg,  2002,  2003;  Keuschnigg  and  Nielsen,  2001,  2003a,b;  Armour, 
2003). Most obviously, we might expect the supply of funds for investment by 
venture capitalists to be affected by relevant taxes and subsidies. Furthermore, 
regulations that restrict the range of investments open to collective investment 
schemes—such  as  pension  funds—can  be  expected  to  inhibit  the  supply  of 
capital. Similarly, demand for venture capital finance—that is, the number of 
entrepreneurs seeking funding for projects—might also be affected by relevant 
taxes  and  subsidies.  For  example,  low  rates  of  capital  gains  tax  mean  that 
successful  entrepreneurs  keep  a  larger  ‘slice’  of  their  earnings.  In  addition, 
demand  may  be  affected  by  the  way  in  which  legal  variables  impact  upon 
unsuccessful entrepreneurs. For example, bankruptcy law affects the ‘hardness’ 
of  the  landing  experienced  by  those  whose  projects  fail,  and  so  might  be 
expected to play an important role in determining demand.  
 
There is some support for these hypotheses from time-series studies of US data. 
Levels of venture capital investment have been shown to be affected by the 
regulation of pension funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1999), levels of capital gains 
tax  (Poterba,  1989a,b;  Gompers,  1998;  Gompers  and  Lerner,  1998)  and  the 
provision of state subsidies to ‘seed’ the development of VC markets (Lerner, 
1999,  2002b).  How,  if  at  all,  these  factors  may  make  a  difference  across   7
countries  is  less  clearly  understood.  If  any  of  these  factors  mattered 
significantly, this would be of great interest to policymakers. 
 
The existing literature on cross-country comparisons has tended to suffer, on the 
one hand, from a failure to distinguish variables affecting supply from those 
affecting demand and, on the other hand, a failure to specify legal variables in 
accordance with a clearly-specified theory of how they are expected to impact 
upon venture capital investment. Thus, a number of studies have considered a 
range of ‘legality’ variables drawn from the work of La Porta et al (1997, 1998) 
(Jeng and Wells, 2000; Allen and Song, 2003; Lerner and Schoar, 2003). At a 
high degree of generality, it should be expected that greater respect for the rule 
of law should be a determinant of venture capital investment, given that the 
latter relies heavily on complex investment contracts. However, many of the 
other variables considered in La Porta et al’s studies—for example, minority 
shareholder  rights,  antidirector  rights and  creditor  rights—are  likely  to  have 
very little impact upon venture capital investment activity, as the rights of VCs 
derive largely from their complex investment contracts, as opposed to general 
corporate law (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Thus, several of these studies report 
findings of no correlation (Jeng and Wells, 2000) or even negative correlations 
(Allen and Song, 2003) between shareholder rights-type variables and venture 
capital investments.
13  
3.  Theories and formulation of hypotheses  
To  investigate  differences  in  aggregate  levels  of  demand  for  and  supply  of 
private  equity  investment  across  countries,  it  is  important  to  identify  an 
appropriate menu of legal variables that impacts the supply of and demand for 
venture capital and private equity finance, and distinguish supply-based legal 
variables from demand-based legal variables. In this section, we outline theories 
and develop three hypotheses about how law may matter for venture capital 
finance. We begin in subsection 3.1 with a theory that is derived from what 
industry experts say are legal and fiscal variables that matter for the supply of 
venture capital. In subsection 3.2 we consider a second supply-side factor: the 
role  of  public  subsidies  designed  to  stimulate  venture  capital  investment. 
Finally, in subsection 3.3, we develop a theory relating to a feature of the legal 
environment  that  we  argue  will  affect  demand  for  venture  capital:  personal 
bankruptcy law.  
 
3.1  Supply-side: the EVCA ‘investor-friendliness’ benchmark 
 
Crucial to the success of legal reform is the need to understand the mechanism 
by  which laws impact upon the venture capital market. Our first hypothesis   8
adopts the thinking of a leading trade association, the European Venture Capital 
Association  (‘EVCA’).  EVCA  has  in  recent  years  been  a  vocal  lobbyist  of 
European governments for changes in local laws designed to facilitate venture 
capital and private equity investment. A recent report (EVCA, 2003) sets out a 
‘benchmark’  index  for  tax  and  legal  environments,  taking  into  account  a 
multitude of legal and fiscal measures in unison that EVCA consider will be 
likely to stimulate supply of venture capital finance.  
 
The EVCA index (see EVCA, 2003) is a composite ranking of many factors, 
including:  
 
￿ the tax transparency for domestic investors; 
￿ the ability to avoid permanent establishment for international investors 
from treaty or non-treaty countries; 
￿ the  ability  to  incorporate  a  tax  efficient  capital  investment  regarding 
incentives for fund managers; 
￿ the  ability  to  avoid  paying  value-added  tax  (VAT)  on  management 
charges; 
￿ the ability to avoid paying VAT on carried interest; 
￿ the degree of restrictions on investments; 
￿ mergers regulations (including whether or not there is an obligation to 
suspend a deal until the responsible authority makes a decision); 
￿ the  regulation  on  pension  funds  in  their  ability  to  invest  in  venture 
capital; 
￿ the corporate tax rate on profits and dividends; 
￿ the corporate tax rate for SMEs; 
￿ the capital gains tax rate; 
￿ the tax incentives for individual investors; 
￿ stock options taxation; 
￿ fiscal R&D incentives; and 
￿ time and capital involved in setting up a private limited partnership or 
company. 
 
The EVCA index is structured in a way that a lower number (on a 3-point scale) 
indicates a better legal and tax environment for the venture capital or private 
equity fund itself. We make use of this index in our empirical study to identify 
equations for the supply of venture capital and private equity across countries. 
For reasons of collinearity across variables discussed further below, we do not 
use each of these variables separately.   9
 
Hypothesis  1:    The  EVCA  index  is  a  significant  determinant  of  the  supply  of 
venture capital and private equity. We would expect the impact to be similar for all 
stages of investment. We also conjecture that countries with better (lower) EVCA 




3.2  Supply-side: government funds 
 
Our  second  line  of  enquiry  concerns  the  impact  of  government-backed 
programs on the levels of private venture capital investment. Is it possible for 
governments to ‘seed’ the development of a venture capital industry by setting 
up publicly funded venture capital funds? Put simply, the best available answer 
appears  to  be  that  ‘it  depends’  on  the  careful  specification  of  the  scheme’s 
structure (Gilson, 2003). A well-designed scheme can, it appears, stimulate the 
provision of private finance. However, a poorly designed public fund will at 
best  waste  resources,  and  at  worst  may  actively  hinder  the  development  of 
private equity markets (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003b). In this section, we 
illustrate how in some cases design problems have led to the underperformance 
of  such  schemes.  We  then  outline  hypotheses  for  testing  whether  public 
schemes across our sample of 15 countries have in general helped or hindered 
private equity investment and fundraising. This line of enquiry  may give an 
insight into how easy this policy instrument has been for governments to use, at 
least to date. Moreover, conducting this test in the context of our simultaneous 
equations  specification  allows  for  us  to  compare  its  impact  with  the  other 
economic and legal variables under consideration.  
 
The  design  and  structure  of  public  venture  capital  funds varies  widely  and, 
because of this, it is difficult to generalise about the mechanisms by which they 
may  affect  levels  of  private  equity  investment.  That  said,  it  is  possible  to 
hypothesise various outcomes. On the one hand, the provision of public funds in 
a country with no, or an underdeveloped, tradition of venture capital, may act to 
‘pump prime’ demand by entrepreneurs, thereby opening up new markets. On 
the other hand, if the incentives of public fund managers are not appropriately 
set, they may end up making poor investments and wasting public money.
14 
Worse still, if public funds compete for the same investments as private venture 
capitalists,  the  public  money  may  actually  ‘crowd  out’  investment  from  the 
private sector. 
 
This latter point is worth expanding upon. Such ‘crowding out’ might occur by 
a variety of means. If public funds receive direct investment from government, 
and  their  managers  are  not  incentivised  to  maximise  fund  value  by  an   10
appropriate set of governance mechanisms, they will face a less binding budget 
constraint  than  private  fund  managers,  who  by  virtue  of  their  contractual 
restrictions will be concerned to maximise the returns to their end investors. We 
might expect weak fund manager incentives to result in poor returns. The first 
German VC fund (the ‘WFG’), which was government-backed, provides a good 
illustration of the problem (Becker and Hellmann, 2003). The WFG’s supply of 
future  funds  was  not  made  dependent  on  the  investment  fund’s  past 
performance.  Moreover,  the  fund  managers’  personal  compensation  did  not 
reflect their successes or failures. These weak incentives, coupled with lack of 
experience, lead to poor selection of initial investments and the use of only 
rudimentary  contractual  protection  against  agency  costs  in  the  VC-portfolio 
company  relationship.  Unsurprisingly,  the  result  was  disastrous:  the  WFG’s 
average internal rate of return was –25%.
15 Even today, German public-private 
partnership funds do not make use of such sophisticated contractual protection 
as their purely private counterparts (Bascha and Walz, 2001).  
 
If public venture capital funds facing weak budget constraints are not prohibited 
from competing with private funds for the same investments, then the public 
funds  will  be  able  to  outbid  their  private  counterparts  for  promising 
opportunities.  The  expectation  of  such  contests  would  in  turn  reduce 
end-investors’  willingness  to  commit  money  to  private  equity  funds,  the 
opposite effect to that desired by policymakers. Instead of enhancing the supply 
of private funds, government programs in such scenarios are simply substituting 
for them. Moreover, institutional investors may be required to commit to private 
equity funds well in advance of their knowing the extent to which government 
funds will be invested in the market. If the agents responsible for the relevant 
decisions  at  the  institutions  are  risk  averse,  then  they  will  overestimate  the 
presence  of  government  funds,  and  commensurately  reduce  their  level  of 
commitment to private funds. This could result in a net reduction in the total 
(public and private) funds invested as venture capital invested: that is the overall 
degree of crowding out may be even greater than 100%.
16 
 
Another form of public scheme involves indirect public support through tax 
subsidies given to investors committing funds to certain investment vehicles. 
The  goal  of  such  schemes  is  to  stimulate  investment  in  venture  capital,  by 
tempting taxable investors with higher expected returns. However, it may be 
that  they  only  result  in  another  substitution  effect,  if  taxable  investors  who 
would  formerly  have  invested  in  non-subsidised  funds  simply  switch  to 
subsidised funds.
17 If this is coupled with poorly designed incentives for the 
managers  of  the  subsidised  funds,
18  competition  between  subsidised  and 
private-sector  funds  for  the  same  investment  opportunities  could  compound 
matters,  again  potentially  leading  to  an  overall  level  of  crowding  out  that   11
exceeds  100%.  In  Canada,  for  example,  Cumming  and  MacIntosh  (2003b) 
provide evidence consistent with such a ‘crowding out’ effect. The introduction 
of  legislation  setting  up  subsidised  Labour-Sponsored  Venture  Capital 
Corporations (LSVCCs) actually led to an overall reduction of the supply of 
venture capital funds.
19  
   
It seems perfectly plausible, in theory, that a public scheme could be designed 
with  more  effective  governance—perhaps  through  harnessing  private  sector 
monitoring more effectively, and reducing or eliminating incentives for public 
funds to compete with private funds—and thereby avoid crowding out. It is 
similarly plausible that such a scheme could achieve good rates of return. What 
is not so well understood is how straightforward this design task is, particularly 
when  compared  to  other  policy  instruments  that  might  be  employed.  By 
examining the impact of the provision of a significant proportion of a country’s 
venture capital finance through direct or indirectly subsidised schemes, we are 
able to consider whether, in most cases, this design problem has been solved 
effectively. This leads us to formulate two alternative hypotheses:  
 
 
Hypothesis  2a:  Government-sponsored  funds  seed  private  investment  and 
increase the overall level of venture capital investment and fundraising.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Government-sponsored funds crowd out private investment and 




3.3  Demand side: Personal bankruptcy laws and the value of a ‘fresh start’  
 
Personal  bankruptcy  laws  vary  widely  across  countries,  reflecting  differing 
national  policies  concerning  the  rehabilitation  of  debtors.  This  subsection 
outlines  a  theory  of  how  personal  bankruptcy  law  may  affect  demand  for 
venture capital finance. Despite its significance for entrepreneurship, the links 
between bankruptcy law and venture capital finance have not been explored in 
previous  literature.
20  Moreover,  because  the  EVCA  index  relates  solely  to 
supply-side factors, it does not include any bankruptcy-related factors.  
 
A link between bankruptcy law and VC finance seems at first counterintuitive. 
The fact that VC finance complements projects with ‘soft’ assets implies that, 
where VC-backed projects fail, there will be few liquid assets over which to 
fight (Gilson and Schizer, 2003). Hence the structure of corporate insolvency 
proceedings is unlikely to make much difference to incentives ex ante. Indeed, 
the lack of liquid assets means there will be little debt capacity anyway, and so   12
few creditors even to be interested in insolvency proceedings. At first blush, 
personal  insolvency  law  would  seem  to  have  even  less  impact  on  VC 
investment,  given  that,  even  in  the  unlikely  event  that  a  venture-backed 
company should go into corporate bankruptcy proceedings, its founders would 
have limited liability.   
 
The  discussion  has  so  far  focused  on  the  position  where  a  venture-backed 
company fails, implicitly assuming it was started in the first place. However, 
we argue that personal insolvency law may have a pronounced impact at the 
‘pre-seed’ stage—that is, before an application is made to a venture capitalist 
for finance. In jurisdictions where the sanctions for personal bankruptcy are 
most  severe,  marginal  entrepreneurs  will  be  deterred  from  shouldering  the 
personal financial risk necessary to prepare an application for venture capital 
finance. Moreover, inframarginal entrepreneurs who have experienced failure in 
the  past  may  be  prevented  from  founding  new  businesses  if  they  are  not 
discharged from bankruptcy. In order to explain these conjectures, this section 
will first consider the operation of personal bankruptcy law, and then turn to the 
way in which this might interact with entrepreneurs’ decisions as to whether to 
prepare an application for venture capital finance.  
 
Purposes of personal bankruptcy law 
 
In the US, Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are open both to 
individuals and to corporate debtors. However, many countries have different 
procedures for individuals and corporates, or distinguish according to whether 
the debtor is a ‘trader’ (individual or corporate) or a consumer. In this paper, we 
use the term ‘personal’ bankruptcy law to refer to the bankruptcy regime that 
would govern an individual entrepreneur engaged in business start-up, should 
the business fail. Bankruptcy law generally provides an orderly mechanism for 
the realisation of the insolvent’s assets.
21 In addition, and more importantly for 
our purposes, personal bankruptcy law also serves functions to punish or to 
rehabilitate financially distressed individuals. The way in which the bankruptcy 
law applicable to individuals is structured can therefore impact significantly on 
the incentives and ability of individuals to engage in high-risk business activity. 
We  now  turn  to  consider  the  way  in  which  these  sanctions  differ  across 
countries. 
 
Generally  speaking,  personal  insolvency  proceedings  typically  result  in  a 
divestment  of  the  debtor’s  ownership  of  most  of  his  assets  in  favour  of  an 
official  Trustee,  who  will  liquidate  them  in  order  to  raise  money  to  pay 
creditors. Whilst the individual remains ‘in bankruptcy’, any assets that fall into   13
his patrimony will automatically also pass to the Trustee. Thus future income 
earned by the debtor will also be available for distribution to creditors. 
 
The ‘severity’ of these consequences for the debtor are mitigated in two ways. 
First, some assets are exempt from the process. Universally, debtors are entitled 
to retain living expenses, personal effects and the like. In the US, debtors are 
also allowed to retain an interest in their homes, although the maximum value of 
this  ‘homestead  exemption’  varies  from  state  to  state.  Secondly,  and  more 
importantly for present purposes, many jurisdictions allow a bankrupt debtor to 
obtain a ‘fresh start’: namely, that after a certain period of time, a bankrupt is 
permitted  to  discharge  his  outstanding  credit  obligations  and  emerge  from 
bankruptcy proceedings (Hallinan, 1986). Many jurisdictions do not permit a 
discharge of debts following insolvency (see Armour, 2002, for details). For 
those that do, the length of time which must elapse, and the other conditions 




The link between personal bankruptcy law and demand for VC finance 
 
We suggest that the ‘severity’ of personal bankruptcy law will impact upon two 
types of potential entrepreneurs, whom we term ‘marginal’ and ‘inframarginal’ 
respectively. We now explain each in turn.  
 
The process of raising venture capital finance itself involves transaction costs. A 
putative entrepreneur must have at least the genesis of a product, develop a 
credible  business  plan  and  assemble  a  team  in  order  to  convince  a  venture 
capitalist that their project is worth backing. Whilst a VC will of course add 
value to the entrepreneur’s efforts, they will want to see that the raw material is 
worthwhile.  Gearing  up  for  a  ‘pitch’  will  therefore  require  putative 
entrepreneurs to invest time and money. This ‘pre-seed’ financing will need to 
be sourced from the entrepreneurs’ personal finances, or those of his friends and 
family.
23 At the same time, entrepreneurs often have to give up their regular 
jobs whilst the process is ongoing. Thus going through this process will impose 
a severe strain on the entrepreneur’s personal finances: income may have ceased 
whilst outgoings dramatically increase. If the entrepreneur fails at the outset to 
raise venture capital finance,
24 then the entrepreneur will find himself or herself 
in  a  position  of  considerable  personal  financial  fragility,  where  personal 
financial resources have been depleted and they have no job. The ‘downside’ 
outcomes may include potential personal bankruptcy, either if the entrepreneur 
is unable to regain paid employment quickly enough so as to pay her fixed 
outgoings, or worse still, if the entrepreneur has borrowed to fund the pre-seed 
stage.
25    14
The structure of personal bankruptcy law will in many cases therefore affect the 
marginal entrepreneur’s decision whether or not to ‘take the leap’ to pursue 
innovative  business  ideas,  by  dampening  or  exacerbating  the  potential 
‘downside’  consequences.  If  potential  entrepreneurs  have  heterogeneous  risk 
preferences,  then  relaxing  the  ‘severity’  of  the  consequences  of  personal 
bankruptcy—whether increasing the level of exemptions, or reducing the time 
to discharge—may be expected to increase the willingness of entrepreneurs to 
borrow  to  fund  ‘pre-seed’  financing.  This  in  turn  will  increase  demand  for 
venture capital finance.   
 
Existing  studies  have  found  a  correlation  between  the  levels  of  exemptions 
available under personal bankruptcy law in different US states and levels of 
entrepreneurship, measured by reference to self-employment (Fan and White, 
2002; Georgellis and Wall, 2002). States with more generous exemptions have 
more entrepreneurs, which although it does not relate directly to demand for 
venture  capital,  it  provides  support  for  the  conjecture  that  bankruptcy  law 
affects the incentives of marginal entrepreneurs.
26 
 
A  second  effect  of  personal  insolvency  law  concerns  the  ease  with  which 
inframarginal  entrepreneurs  may  be  rehabilitated  into  the  economy  after  a 
bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy  is  just  as  likely  to  occur  because  of  ‘bad  luck’  as 
because of incompetence on the part of the entrepreneur. If no ‘fresh start’ is 
available to exit bankruptcy, then entrepreneurs get only one chance to fail, 
because they will be unable to raise pre-seed funds in circumstances where all 
their present and future assets must be handed over to creditors. Conversely, a 
readily available  ‘fresh start’  means that  failed  entrepreneurs  can be rapidly 
rehabilitated (Jackson, 1985; Georgakopoulos, 2002). Perhaps surprisingly, this 
potential effect of time to discharge on inframarginal entrepreneurs has not, to 
our knowledge, been tested empirically.
27  
 
Levels of exemptions from personal bankruptcy do not differ widely outside the 
US.  In  fact,  the  US  is  an  outlier:  in  all  other  jurisdictions  we  surveyed, 
permitted  exemptions  were  very  modest—clothing,  personal  effects,  living 
expenses  and  the  like.  However,  there  are  significant  differences  across 
countries in the time to discharge in the event of bankruptcy.  Some countries 
have no time to discharge (e.g. the U.S.), others have a lengthy period prior to 
discharge  (e.g.  12  years  in  Ireland  and  6  years  in  Germany),  others  allow 
discharge only at the discretion of the bankruptcy court, and others do not allow 
a ‘fresh start’ at all. Thus, we formulate our third hypothesis in terms of time to 
discharge:  
   15
 
Hypothesis 3: Personal bankruptcy laws that are ‘softer’ on failed entrepreneurs, 
in the sense that they offer a ‘fresh start’ quickly, will stimulate demand for venture 
capital finance. Because the posited mechanism turns on the ‘pre-seed’ stage, we 
would expect the impact to be much more marked for early-stage than later-stage 
investments.  
 
4.  Data and summary statistics 
This section outlines our data and provides summary statistics. We study 13 
years  (1990 –  2002)  of  private  equity  investing  from  15  countries:  Austria, 
Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US.  We pool the data 
(as described in, e.g. Judge et al, 1988) to form a total of 195 observations.  We 
make  use  of  publicly  available  data  from  the  European  Venture  Capital 




We do not consider developing countries or countries from other regions. This 
is  because  to  do  so  would  involve  confronting  pronounced  institutional 
differences that give rise to problems associated with combining analyses and 
data across countries (see e.g. Gompers et al, 2003b, and Lerner and Schoar, 
2003, for an analysis and discussion of private equity in developing countries).  
Our analysis is based on countries with legal and institutional structures that 
have significant differences for the purpose of comparative analyses, but not so 
different that an entirely different empirical approach is warranted for subsets of 
the data. Moreover, our analysis does not consider the period prior to 1990, 
because the venture capital and private equity markets in prior years in certain 
countries in our sample were not very well developed. Relatedly, data in prior 
years in those countries with smaller venture capital markets are less reliable.   
 
For comparative purposes across countries, the data are scaled by the GDP in 
each country. A snapshot of the data is provided in Figure 1.  Figure 1 indicates 
the  total  amount  of  early  stage  investment  (investment  in  ‘idea’  type 
entrepreneurial  companies  without  positive  earnings),  expansion  stage 
investment  (investment  in  companies  that  could  be  earning  profits  but  need 
significant capital inflows for plant expansion, marketing, and to initiate product 
commercialization),  total  private  equity  (including  all  types  of  early  stage 
venture capital and other forms of private equity such as late stage, buyout and 
turnaround investments), total fundraising (capital flows from institutional and 
investors into venture capital and private equity funds, for all types of private 
equity in each country), and total dispositions or exits (the value of all sale   16
transactions through either IPOs, acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks and 
write-offs), each expressed as a proportion of GDP in each country. The values 
are averaged for the full 1990 – 2002 period in Figure 1. There are lags between 
the  time  that  venture  capital  and  private  equity  funds  receive  capital  for 
investment from institutional investors and the time that capital is reinvested 
into entrepreneurial firms (Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001), hence the total 
fundraising values do not match the total private equity investment values. 
 
Figure 1.  Venture  Capital  and  Private  Equity  Investing,  Fundraising  and  Dispositions 
Relative to GDP, 1990-2002 
 
Figure 1 indicates that the largest market in terms of early and expansion stage 
venture capital investment relative to GDP is the U.S. The U.K. has the largest 
total private equity market and greatest amount of fundraising relative to GDP, 
which is attributable to the greater number of large scale buyout transactions.  
U.K. private equity investors have also brought about the largest average value 
of exits relative to GDP, followed closely by the U.S. Austria has the smallest 
venture capital and private equity market on all the metrics reported in Figure 1. 
 
Table 1 provides an initial insight into the rationales for the relative size of the 
values  presented  in  Figure  1.  Table  1  provides  a  number  of  comparison  of 
means tests depending on the value of the country-specific MSCI stock market 
return (lagged one year), the real GDP growth (lagged one year), the 1999-2000 
bubble period, the proportion of self-employment (lagged one year), the number 


























































































































tax and legal index (the 3-point scale, as defined in section 3.1), and the extent 
to  which  government  funds  participate  in  the  market.  These  comparison  of 
means  tests  strongly  indicate  that  early  stage,  expansion  stage,  total  private 
equity, fundraising and exits (all relative to GDP) are higher when the prior 
year’s  MSCI returns  and real  GDP  growth  are higher  (and  when  we  are  in 
bubble periods such as 1999-2000), and when there has been greater patent 
activity in the prior year.  
 
The  data  also  show  that  legal  factors  are  significant:  early  stage,  expansion 
stage, total private equity, fundraising and exits (all relative to GDP) are higher 
when time to discharge in bankruptcy is lower, the EVCA tax and legal index is 
lower (whereby a lower value for the index indicates a more favourable tax and 
legal environment for venture capital and private equity funds), and when direct 
government  investment  comprises  less  than  20%  of  the  total  private  equity 
market.
29 All of these effects for each variable (with the exception of 3 in the 
entire matrix) are statistically significant, and most are significant at the 1% 
level of significance. 
 
Table 2 further explores the relations across the economic and legal variables 
presented  in  Table  1,  along  with  country-specific  dummy  variables.  The 
statistically  and  economically  significant  correlations  indicated  in  Table  2 
provide strong support for the comparison of means test statistics presented in 
Table 1.   
 
Table 2 also provides guidance for the simultaneous use of different variables in 
regression  models  in  the  subsection,  and  for  subsets  of  the  data  excluding 
certain countries. Below we present a concise set of regression results that are 
quite robust to the specification. Additional specifications (above and beyond 
the ones provided) are not explicitly provided, as the results did not materially 
change, but are nevertheless available upon request. The empirical methods and 
test results are discussed further in the next sections.  
1
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics and Difference Tests 
 
This table presents difference of means tests for the size of the venture capital and private equity market for the period 1990-2002 across 15 
countries (195 observations): Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain,  Sweden,  the  UK,  and  the  US.  The  tests  are  carried  out  for  the  total  value  of  venture  capital  and  private  equity  (early  stage 
investments, expansion stage investments, total private equity investments, total private equity fundraising, and the total values of all “exits” 
or dispositions) per GDP in the country.   
 
   Early Stage VC / GDP  Expansion Stage VC / GDP  Total Private Equity / GDP 
   Average Value  Difference Test  Average Value  Difference Test  Average Value  Difference Test 
MSCI Index Return (lagged 1 year) > 0  2.641E-04  6.002E-04  1.479E-03 






                   
Real GDP Growth (lagged 1 year) > 0  2.634E-04  5.773E-04  1.397E-03 






                    
Years 1999 and 2000 Only  6.986E-04  1.199E-03  3.170E-03 






                    
Self-employment / Population (lagged 1 year) > 0.06  2.695E-04  6.075E-04  1.575E-03 






                    
Patents (lagged 1 year) > 1000  3.441E-04  7.321E-04  1.973E-03 






                    
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy > 30 years  1.512E-04  3.862E-04  9.272E-04 






                    
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (low number more favorable) > 2  1.863E-04  4.050E-04  9.979E-04 






                    
Government Funds > 20% Total Private Equity Market  2.188E-04  3.661E-04  7.039E-04 







Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
1
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics and Difference Tests (continued) 
 
   Total Fundraising / GDP  Total Dispositions / GDP 
   Average Value  Difference Test  Average Value  Difference Test 
MSCI Index Return (lagged 1 year) > 0  2.010E-03  6.128E-04 




              
Real GDP Growth (lagged 1 year) > 0  1.946E-03  5.992E-04 




              
Years 1999 and 2000 Only  4.109E-03  1.014E-03 




              
Self-employment / Population (lagged 1 year) > 0.06  2.261E-03  7.036E-04 




              
Patents (lagged 1 year) > 1000  2.538E-03  8.506E-04 




              
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy > 30 years  1.323E-03  3.090E-04 




             
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (low number more favorable) > 2  1.510E-03  3.752E-04 




             
Government Funds > 20% Total Private Equity Market  8.134E-04  2.536E-04 





Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   20
Table 2.  Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents correlation coefficients across the dependent and independent variables 














































































































































































Early Stage Investments / GDP  1.00                   
Expansion Stage VC / GDP  0.78  1.00                
Total Private Equity / GDP  0.71  0.85  1.00             
Fundraising / GDP  0.52  0.58  0.79  1.00          
Exits / GDP  0.53  0.76  0.71  0.56  1.00       
MSCI Index Return (lagged 1 year)  0.16  0.14  0.21  0.17  0.09  1.00    
Real GDP (lagged 1 year)  0.17  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.12  0.35  1.00 
Dummy Variable for 1999 and 2000  0.50  0.43  0.48  0.40  0.23  0.25  0.27 
Trend  0.46  0.34  0.39  0.45  0.19  0.03  0.18 
Self Employment / Population (lagged 1 year)  -0.14  -0.17  -0.19  -0.19  -0.20  -0.03  0.12 
Patents (lagged 1 year)  0.34  0.39  0.25  0.12  0.32  0.02  -0.01 
Time to Discharge  -0.36  -0.37  -0.34  -0.28  -0.40  0.03  -0.21 
EVCA Tax and Legal Index  -0.28  -0.40  -0.41  -0.34  -0.45  -0.01  -0.20 
Dummy Variable for Government VC > 20%  -0.04  -0.17  -0.22  -0.24  -0.20  -0.03  -0.05 
Austria Dummy Variable  -0.14  -0.19  -0.19  -0.16  -0.16  -0.06  -0.03 
Belgium Dummy Variable  0.03  0.01  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04  0.00  -0.06 
Canada Dummy Variable  0.27  0.06  0.02  -0.03  -0.06  -0.06  0.00 
Denmark Dummy Variable  -0.05  -0.12  -0.13  -0.07  -0.14  0.00  -0.06 
Finland Dummy Variable  0.06  -0.07  -0.06  0.00  -0.07  0.13  -0.09 
France Dummy Variable  -0.05  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.09  0.00  -0.08 
Germany Dummy Variable  -0.01  -0.03  -0.06  -0.08  -0.05  0.01  -0.12 
Ireland Dummy Variable  -0.03  0.00  -0.08  -0.04  0.02  0.04  0.51 
Italy Dummy Variable  -0.11  -0.12  -0.10  -0.11  -0.14  -0.06  -0.12 
The Netherlands Dummy Variable  0.06  0.18  0.12  0.02  0.17  0.02  0.01 
Portugal Dummy Variable  -0.13  -0.10  -0.13  -0.15  -0.09  0.00  0.01 
Spain Dummy Variable  -0.13  -0.10  -0.12  -0.13  -0.11  -0.03  0.01 
Sweden Dummy Variable  0.04  0.06  0.25  0.29  0.03  0.01  -0.09 
UK Dummy Variable  -0.04  0.18  0.38  0.45  0.39  -0.02  0.00 
US Dummy Variable  0.27  0.28  0.17  0.05  0.24  0.03  0.01 
 
Note:  Significant correlations at the 5% level are underlined and in bold. 
   21




























































































































































































Early Stage Investments / GDP                      
Expansion Stage VC / GDP                      
Total Private Equity / GDP                      
Fundraising / GDP                      
Exits / GDP                      
MSCI Index Return (lagged 1 year)                      
Real GDP (lagged 1 Year)                      
Dummy Variable for 1999 and 2000  1.00                   
Trend  0.40  1.00                
Self Employment / Population (lagged 1 year)  0.01  0.01  1.00             
Patents (lagged 1 Year)  0.05  -0.14  0.17  1.00          
Time to Discharge  -0.10  -0.14  0.17  -0.45  1.00       
EVCA Tax and Legal Index  -0.01  -0.01  0.09  -0.50  0.81  1.00    
Dummy Variable for Government VC > 20%  -0.02  -0.03  0.31  -0.20  -0.02  0.16  1.00 
Austria Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.13  -0.09  0.20  0.35  0.38 
Belgium Dummy Variable  0.00  0.00  -0.05  -0.09  0.08  0.10  -0.05 
Canada Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  0.15  -0.09  -0.43  -0.24  0.48 
Denmark Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.22  -0.10  0.19  0.32  -0.11 
Finland Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.03  -0.09  0.20  0.18  -0.06 
France Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.21  -0.02  -0.11  0.07  -0.15 
Germany Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.24  0.12  0.03  0.28  -0.16 
Ireland Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  0.17  -0.10  -0.28  -0.24  -0.06 
Italy Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  0.34  -0.06  0.21  0.00  -0.11 
The Netherlands Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.15  -0.08  0.02  -0.11  -0.16 
Portugal Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  0.75  -0.11  0.18  0.22  0.23 
Spain Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  0.11  -0.10  0.20  0.13  0.03 
Sweden Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.10  -0.08  0.23  0.08  -0.11 
UK Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.05  -0.04  -0.40  -0.48  -0.16 
US Dummy Variable  0.01  0.01  -0.33  0.95  -0.44  -0.55  -0.16 
 
Note:  Significant correlations at the 5% level are underlined and in bold. 
 
 
5.  Empirical methods 
 
In this section we describe the empirical approach to estimating demand and 
supply reported in subsection 6.1. The data are pooled and stacked by country 
and  year  to  comprise  195 observations in  total.  To study  the  flow  of  funds 
between venture capital / private equity funds and entrepreneurial firms (the   22




(1) Demand for Capital = a1 + b11 MSCI Public Market Return (lagged 1 year) + b12 Real 
GDP Growth (lagged 1 year) + b13 Dummy Variable for 1999 and 2000 + b14 Trend + b15 
Self Employment / Working Population (lagged 1 year) + b16 Patents (lagged 1 year) + b17 
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy + e1 
 
(2) Supply of Capital = a2 + b21 MSCI Public Market Return (lagged 1 year) + b22 Real 
GDP Growth (lagged 1 year) + b23 Dummy Variable for 1999 and 2000 + b24 Trend + b25 
EVCA Tax and Legal Index (where a lower value is better) + b26 Government Programs + e2 
 
Consistent with Gompers and Lerner (1998), Black and Gilson (1998) and Jeng 
and Wells (2000), there is a close connection between venture capital markets 
and stock markets, as both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs typically hope 
for an IPO exit as a way to liquidate their investment (typically after 3 – 7 
years). Similarly, there is a connection between real economic activity and the 
demand for venture finance. As such, the MSCI return and real GDP growth 
variables are included (and lagged one year to avoid timing and/or endogeneity 
problems), and a dummy variable was included for the bubble period. The trend 
term is included to detrend the data so that spurious correlations are not picked 
up in the regressions from two or more positively trending time series of data 
(see e.g. Powell, 1966; Johnson et al, 1984). All of these variables affect both 
the  demand  for  and  supply  of  venture  capital,  and  therefore  appear in  both 
equations. 
 
A few variables that are included in the demand equation do not appear in the 
supply equation, and vice versa, for the purpose of statistical identification. The 
exclusion  of  the  respective  variables  is  intuitive.  On  the  demand  side,  an 
increase in self-employment rates in the prior year and patent activity in the 
prior  year  could lead to  an  increase in  the demand  for  venture  capital  (and 
therefore,  indirectly,  an  increase  in  supply,  but  this  indirect  effect  does  not 
warrant inclusion of these variables directly in the supply equation). 
 
In the supply equation, we use the EVCA tax and legal index (see section 3.1), 
for which a lower value indicates a more favourable environment specifically 
for venture capital and private equity funds. It is noteworthy that other legal 
indices could be used (see section 2.2), but high correlations prevent use of 
similar  variables.  As  discussed,  the  EVCA  index  is  used  because  it  was 
designed by and for practitioners to assess the overall tax and legal environment 
as it pertains to setting up a venture capital or private equity fund in a country. 
   23
The supply equation also makes use of a dummy variable for government funds 
that directly invest capital in entrepreneurial firms. The dummy variable takes 
the value 1 if such funds comprised more than 20% of the overall investment in 
the particular year in the country, and 0 otherwise. As a result of the definition 
of this variable, and more generally the incentives for a government to set up 
and give capital to a private equity fund, this variable for government funds is 
treated as endogenous in the system of equations for all reported estimations.
31 
The alternative specifications and estimation results are described below. 
 
Consistently  with  the  theory  developed  in  section  3.3,  we  include  in  the 
demand-side  specification  a  variable  denoting  the  number  of  years  until  a 
discharge  from  pre-bankruptcy  debt  is  available.  Recall  that  some  countries 
have no time to discharge, others have a specified period prior to discharge, 
some do not have discharge at all, and others have discretion in discharge.
32 
Where  no  discharge  is  available,  we  substitute  a  measure  of  average  life 
expectancy, to denote the fact that bankrupt debtors in such jurisdictions face 
‘social death’ for the rest of their lives.
33 Where discharge is available, but only 
at the discretion of the court, we substitute half the life expectancy, to capture 
the  fact  that  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  court  may  refuse  to  exercise  its 
discretion. Some countries changed their bankruptcy legislation over the 1990 – 
2002 period studied. For the period of time in countries that did not enable 
discharge  at  all,  we  used  the  number  of  years  for  average  working  life 
expectancy in that country.   
 
It  is  of  course  possible  that  any  observed  correlation  between  temperate 
bankruptcy laws and demand for venture capital finance may be the result of 
other variables that are correlated with both. For example, it may be that some 
countries simply have a more ‘entrepreneurial culture’, which leads them to 
enact  more  temperate  bankruptcy  laws  and  to  greater  demand  for  venture 
capital.  We  utilise  two  control  variables  to  check  against  this  possibility: 
self-employment and patent applications. 
6.  Empirical results 
In  subsection  6.1  we  describe  the  estimates  of  the  demand  for  capital  by 
entrepreneurs and the supply of capital by venture capital and private equity 
funds. Fundraising vis-à-vis venture capital funds and institutional investors is 
considered in subsection 6.2. Subsection 6.3 provides a complementary analysis 
of estimates of the value of exit transactions. 
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6.1  Demand and supply estimates 
 
This subsection reports the estimates based on the empirical methods outlined 
above in section 4. The first set of estimates is reported in Table 3 for the value 
of  early  stage  transactions  only  (systems  (1)  and  (2))  and  expansion  stage 
transactions only (systems (3) and (4)). Systems (1) and (3) make use of the full 
set of data. Systems (2) and (4) exclude the U.S. observations to illustrate the 
robustness  of  the  results  to  a  country  that  is  (potentially)  an  outlier.  Each 
dependent variable is expressed relative to the GDP in the year in the country. 
 
System (1), (2) and (3) in Table 3 indicates strong support for Hypothesis 1 
(section  3.1)  pertaining  to  the  EVCA  tax  and  legal  index.  The  evidence  is 
statistically significant at the 5% level in system (2) and at the 1% level in 
systems (1) and (3). The evidence is also economically significant. A one-point 
decrease (improvement) in the index (e.g. the approximate difference between 
moving from Spain to the U.K.) gives rise to a 0.036% increase in the amount 
of early stage venture capital financing per GDP (0.025% in system (2) which 
excludes the U.S.). For expansion stage investments, the evidence shows greater 
economic significance at 0.07% in system (3), but is statistically insignificant in 
system (4) where the U.S. data is excluded. 
 
Regarding  government  programs  (section  3.2),  the  data  strongly  support 
Hypothesis 2b and contradict 2a. That is, government funds appear to crowd 
private investment.  In  system  (2)  excluding the  U.S. data,  the  coefficient  is 
statistically insignificant such that government investment has neither increased 
nor decreased the total amount of early stage investment. This implies that the 
investment of public funds has ‘crowded out’ an equal amount of private funds. 
In systems (1), (3) and (4), the presence of significant government programs is 
associated with a reduced overall level of early and expansion stage investment, 
implying that ‘crowding out’ in these cases is more than 100%. In terms of 
economic  significance  in  systems  (1),  (3)  and  (4),  when  government  funds 
comprise more than 20% of a country’s market, early stage investment per GDP 
is 0.04% lower (system (1)), and expansion stage investment is 0.09% lower 
with  the  full  sample  (system  (3))  and  0.02%  lower  when  the  U.S.  data  are 
excluded from the system (system (4)).   
 
The intuition underlying the crowding out phenomenon was discussed above in 
section 3.2. If the purpose of government programs is to expand the overall size 
of  the  pool  of  investment  activity,  this  evidence  suggests  that  extensive 
government programs—that is, those that exceed 20% of the size of the total 
private  equity  market  in  the  country—actually  frustrate  this  objective  rather 
than fulfil it.
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Regarding Hypothesis 3 (section 3.3) pertaining to bankruptcy legislation, the 
data  indicate  that  more  severe  bankruptcy  laws—measured  in  terms  of  the 
number of years to discharge—imply reduced demand for venture capital. In 
terms of economic significance, a 9-year decrease (i.e. a move from Ireland to 
the  U.K.)  in  time  to  discharge  increases  the  amount  of  early  stage  venture 
capital  by  approximately  0.002%  with  the  full  sample  (system  (1))  and  the 
subsample excluding the U.S. (system (2)). Similarly, the legislative change in 
The Netherlands in 1997 from no discharge (or discharge in 48 years based on 
average life expectancy) to 3 years in 1999 lead to an increase in the demand for 
early  stage  venture  capital  transactions  by  0.009%.  For  expansion  stage 
investments, the evidence is less robust in that the effect is significant in system 
(3) including the U.S. data, but not in system (4) excluding the U.S. data. As 
expansion  stage  is  less  closely  connected  to  the  probability  of  bankruptcy 
compared to early stage, there are differences across systems (1) and (2) versus 
systems (3) and (4). This is consistent with Hypothesis 3, which predicts a more 
pronounced impact on early-stage than later-stage investment. 
 
Many of the control variables for economic effects are also significant, as is the 
trend term. The results pertaining to the MSCI, real GDP growth and bubble 
effect depend on which of these variables are included or excluded. That is, 
when  the  bubble  variable  is  included,  the  others  are  generally  insignificant.  
When the bubble variable is excluded, the other economic effects tend to be 
positive  and  significant.  Either  way,  the  particular  specification  in  terms  of 
economic  control  variables  does  not  materially  impact  the  legal  variables 
indicated  above. The self-employment  variable is positive  and  significant  in 
system  (2)  only.  The  variable  for  patents  is  positive  and  significant  in  the 
systems including the U.S. data, but insignificant in the systems excluding the 
U.S. data. Note that the majority of patent activity is derived from the U.S. (see 
the extremely large correlation coefficient of 0.97 between the U.S. dummy 
variable and the patent variable in Table 2).  
 
Table  4  reports  similar  estimates  for  the  combined  value  of  all  early  and 
expansion  stage  transactions  together,  and  for  all  types  of  private  equity 
transactions  including  venture  capital,  buyouts  and  turnaround  transactions 
together.  The  results  are  very  similar  to  those  discussed  in  Table  3,  and 
therefore not discussed at length, as the qualitative implications do not change.  
The similarity in the results across Tables 3 and 4 indicates that the estimates 
are  quite  robust  to  considering  different  definitions  of  venture  capital  and 
private equity. Please refer to Table 4 for the specific details.  
2
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Table 3.  3SLS Estimates of the Demand for and Supply of Early and Expansion Stage Venture Capital, 1990 – 2002 
 
Dependent Variables:  Value of Early Stage or Expansion Stage Investments  
in each Country in each Year divided by the Country’s GDP 
System (1):  Early Stage  System (2):  Early Stage, Excluding US 
Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                 
Constant  -1.04E-05  -0.136  0.0009009  4.283***  -0.000121  -1.485  0.0005361  1.970** 
                 
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.0015325  1.425  0.0012257  0.875  0.001586  1.567  0.0014403  1.382 
                 
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  -0.000296  -0.308  -0.002324  -1.770*  -1.5E-05  -0.016  -0.001253  -1.132 
                 
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  0.0003727  6.022***  0.0004325  5.298***  0.0002957  5.031***  0.000336  5.399*** 
                 
Trend  2.992E-05  5.069***  2.211E-05  2.684***  3.096E-05  5.538***  2.688E-05  4.075*** 
                 
Self-employment / Population in Prior Year  0.0003082  0.35  -  -  0.0015134  2.033**  -  - 
                 
Patents in Prior Year  5.416E-09  4.661***  -  -  1.238E-08  1.205  -  - 
                 
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -2.37E-06  -2.340**  -  -  1.7E-06  -1.726*  -  - 
                 
EVCA Tax /Legal Index (lower value is better)  -  -  -0.000359  -4.584***  -  -  -0.000247  -2.475** 
                 
Government VC Programs (treated as endogenous)  -  -  -0.000453  -2.223**  -  -  -0.000124  -0.788 
                 
         
Number of Observations  195  195  182  182 
F Statistic  23.59***  3.19***  16.19***  15.57*** 
Loglikelihood  5369.989  5317.207  5028.152  5020.919 
Akaike Information Statistic  -54.995  -54.464  -55.167  -55.098 
Adjusted R
2  0.449  0.063  0.370  0.326 
         
 
Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.  3SLS Estimates of the Demand for and Supply of Early and Expansion Stage Venture Capital, 1990 – 2002 (continued) 
 
Dependent Variables:  Value of Early Stage or Expansion Stage Investments  
in each Country in each Year divided by the Country’s GDP 
System (3):  Expansion Stage  System (4):  Expansion Stage, Excluding US 
Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                 
Constant  0.0001299  0.859  0.002018  5.767***  -6.38E-05  -1.181  -0.000193  -1.097 
                 
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.0023282  1.215  0.0017722  0.764  0.0008531  1.081  0.0009375  1.203 
                 
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  0.0009837  0.572  -0.003203  -1.472*  0.000664  0.919  0.0004828  0.601 
                 
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  0.0005608  5.09***  0.0006793  5.026***  0.000277  5.941***  0.000273  5.789*** 
                 
Trend  3.206E-05  3.043***  1.517E-05  1.113***  2.685E-05  6.025***  2.558E-05  5.304*** 
                 
Self-employment / Population in Prior Year  0.0012167  0.723  -  -  -0.000798  -1.244  -  - 
                 
Patents in Prior Year  1.167E-08  5.441***  -  -  9.098E-09  1.299  -  - 
                 
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -3.34E-06  -1.767*  -  -  7.427E-07  1.017  -  - 
                 
EVCA Tax /Legal Index (lower value is better)  -  -  -0.000702  -5.379***  -  -  8.497E-05  1.153 
                 
Government VC Programs (treated as endogenous)  -  -  -0.000903  -2.775**  -  -  -0.000213  -1.791* 
                 
         
Number of Observations  195  195  182  182 
F Statistic  16.50***  3.01***  18.63***  22.33*** 
Loglikelihood  5257.458  5218.967  4714.687  4714.942 
Akaike Information Statistic  -53.841  -53.456  -55.700  -55.715 
Adjusted R
2  0.359  0.058  0.424  0.432 
         
 
Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.  3SLS Estimates of the Demand for and Supply of Early plus Expansion Stage Venture Capital, and All Types of Private Equity, 
1990 – 2002 
 
  
Dependent Variables: Value of Early Stage or Expansion Stage Investments  
in Each Country in Each Year divided by the Country's GDP 
   System (1): Early + Expansion Stage  System (2): Early + Expansion Stage, Excluding US 
   Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                          
Constant  0.000122  0.565  0.002908  5.433***  3.25E-06  0.018  0.000861  1.949* 
                          
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.003845  1.411  0.002966  0.832  0.003128  1.512  0.003033  1.554 
                          
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  0.000715  0.293  -0.00548  -1.64  0.002645  1.384  5.09E-05  0.025 
                          
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  0.000933  5.945***  0.00111  5.346***  0.000598  4.894***  0.000664  5.622*** 
                          
Trend  6.2E-05  4.135***  3.72E-05  1.776*  5.29E-05  4.503***  4.18E-05  3.465*** 
                          
Self Employment / Population in Prior Year  0.001482  0.618  ---  ---  0.001385  0.757  ---  --- 
                      
Patents in Prior Year  1.71E-08  5.540***  ---  ---  4.4E-08  2.295**  ---  --- 
                      
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -5.7E-06  -2.107**  ---  ---  -2E-06  -0.887  ---  --- 
                          
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (lower value is better)  ---  ---  -0.00105  -5.270***  ---  ---  -0.00023  -1.259 
                      
Government VC Programs (treated as endogenous)  ---  ---  -0.0014  -2.697***  ---  ---  -0.00071  -2.387** 
                      
              
Number of Observations  195  195  182  182 
F Statistic  22.53***  2.20**  12.32***  18.81*** 
Loglikelihood  5188.619  5135.084  4551.859  4559.785 
Akaike Information Statistic  -53.135  -52.596  -53.773  -53.879 
Adjusted R
2  0.437  0.036  0.320  0.389 
              
 




Table 4.  3SLS Estimates of the Demand for and Supply of Early plus Expansion Stage Venture Capital, and All Types of Private Equity, 
1990 – 2002 (continued) 
 
  
Dependent Variables: Value of Early Stage or Expansion Stage Investments  
in Each Country in Each Year divided by the Country's GDP 
   System (3): All Private Equity  System (4): All Private Equity, Excluding US 
   Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                          
Constant  -0.00017  -0.543  0.002935  4.154***  -0.00085  -1.579  0.00434  3.443*** 
                          
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.012991  2.512**  0.011991  2.547**  0.01318  2.513***  0.012526  2.594*** 
                          
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  -0.0007  -0.152  -0.00688  -1.559  0.00267  0.552  -0.00934  -1.822* 
                          
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  0.001462  4.911***  0.001656  6.038***  0.001129  3.707***  0.00144  4.994*** 
                          
Trend  0.000135  4.758***  0.000111  4.028***  0.000132  4.529***  8.86E-05  2.900*** 
                          
Self Employment / Population in Prior Year  0.004094  1.048  ---  ---  0.009213  1.877*  ---  --- 
                      
Patents in Prior Year  1.83E-08  3.427***  ---  ---  1.44E-07  2.657***  ---  --- 
                      
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -7.6E-06  -1.651*  ---  ---  -3.4E-06  -0.582  ---  --- 
                          
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (lower value is better)  ---  ---  -0.00119  -4.527***  ---  ---  -0.00165  -3.581*** 
                      
Government VC Programs (treated as endogenous)  ---  ---  -0.00117  -1.706*  ---  ---  -0.00184  -2.537** 
                        
              
Number of Observations  195  195  182  182 
F Statistic  13.85***  25.75***  7.85***  15.46*** 
Loglikelihood  5063.691  5080.920  4728.708  4741.910 
Akaike Information Statistic  -51.853  -52.040  -51.876  -52.032 
Adjusted R
2  0.317  0.434  0.209  0.324 
              
 
Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   30
6.2. Fundraising estimates 
 
In  this  subsection  we  assess  the  determinants  of  the  flow  of  funds  from 
institutional investors to venture capital funds (“fundraising”), as distinct from 
the flow of capital vis-à-vis entrepreneurial firms and venture capital funds.  
Somewhat similar to the methodology employed by Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
and Jeng and Wells (2000) to study fundraising,
35 in this subsection we use OLS 
and  2SLS  (the  2SLS  estimates  are  provided  to  consider  the  potential 
endogeneity  of  the  government  programs  variable).  Following  the  same 
methodology used by Gompers and Lerner (1998) and Jeng and Wells (2000), 
we do not use a system of equations to study fundraising, because demand and 
supply factors can be contemporaneously considered in the same equation for 
fundraising (this is distinct from and unlike the issue of investing, or the flow of 
funds  between  venture  capital  funds  and  entrepreneurial  firms  as  studied  in 
subsection 6.1 and Tables 3 and 4). The fundraising estimates are provided to 
complement the analyses in Tables 3 and 4 provided above. The fundraising 
results are presented in Table 5.   
 
The  evidence  on  fundraising  in  Table  5  is  generally  consistent  with  and 
supportive of the evidence on investing in Tables 3 and 4 pertaining to both the 
legal variables
36 (Hypotheses 1 – 3) and the economic control variables. With 
the detrended data,  that is, specifications  that  include a trend  term  to  avoid 
spurious correlations between the left- and right-hand-side variables, the main 
economic factor driving fundraising across countries over the 1990-2002 period 
was the bubble period. There is, unexpectedly, some evidence of a negative 
relation between fundraising and patent activity; however, this evidence is not 
robust to the particular specification. Similarly, there is unexpected evidence of 
a negative relation between self-employment and fundraising. This latter finding 
is probably attributable to a comparative dearth of pension fund capital—the 
largest  contributor  to  venture  capital  funds  in  Europe  and  North America—
amongst countries with higher levels of self-employment. 
 
The  legal  and  institutional  variables  have  much  more  robust  and  stronger 
economic  effect  on  venture  fundraising.  The  estimates  on  the  impact  on 
fundraising from the EVCA index and the bankruptcy index are sensitive to the 
simultaneous inclusion of both of these right-hand-side variables; therefore, we 
provide alternative specifications. Venture fundraising is much greater among 
countries and time periods with shorter times to discharge in bankruptcy. In 
particular, a reduction in time to discharge in bankruptcy by one year increases 
fundraising/GDP  by  approximately  0.03%.  Similarly,  an  improvement 
(reduction)  in  the  EVCA  index  by  1  point  on  the  3-point  scale  increases 
fundraising/GDP by approximately 0.3%.   31
The impact of government support programs on venture fundraising activity is 
negative and significant in all specifications, which implies crowding out—that 
is, substitution for, or deterrence of, private investment by public investment—
by  more  than  100%.
37  Countries  and  time  periods  for  which  government 
programs  are  more  than  20%  of  the  market  reduce  overall  industry 
fundraising/GDP by approximately 0.05% to 0.1%. These estimates are very 
robust to the potential endogeneity of the government programs variable, as 
shown by the similarity of the OLS and 2SLS estimates in Table 5, and robust 
to  the  inclusion/exclusion  of  the  US  observations  in  the  sample.
38  These 
fundraising  estimates  are  consistent  with  the  investment  estimates  discussed 
above in subsection 6.1. 
 
6.3  Disposition (Exits) estimates 
 
To further complement the investment (Tables 3 and 4) and fundraising (Table 
5)  evidence,  we  provide  estimates  of  the  legal  variables  pertaining  to 
Hypotheses 1 – 3 on the total value of exits (dispositions or sale transactions) 
per GDP in Table 6.   
 
The data indicate industry dispositions are significantly higher among countries 
with  more  favourable  tax  and  legal  environments  (a  1  point  decrease 
(improvement)  in  the  EVCA  index  increases  total  dispositions  per  GDP  by 
0.08%).  The  data  also show  that the  presence  of  government programs  that 
exceed 20% of the private equity market reduces industry dispositions per GDP 
by  0.03%.  Unfavourable  bankruptcy  legislation  further  reduces  industry 
dispositions.  An  increase  in  the  time  to  discharge  by  10  years  reduces 
dispositions  per  GDP  by  0.015%.  One  explanation  for  this  result  is  that 
marginal entrepreneurs with risky but potentially very valuable projects do not 
want to start up a firm because of unfavourable bankruptcy laws. Note that the 
effects from legal variables are much more robust and indicate greater statistical 
and economic significance relative to the economic control variables. 
 
It is noteworthy that the results in Table 6 are consistent with similar evidence 
of lower venture capital returns in Canada relative to the U.S. (Cumming and 
MacIntosh,  2003a),  and  in  Europe  relative  to  the  U.S.  (Hege  et  al,  2003; 
Schwienbacher,  2002).  Cumming  and  MacIntosh,  and  Hege  et  al  and 
Schwienbacher,  however,  do  not  consider  industry-wide  dispositions.  
Moreover, Hege et al, and Schwienbacher do not control for differences across 
different  European  countries.  Table  6  therefore  builds  on  prior  work  by 
providing a first-ever look at industry-wide dispositions across a large number 




Table 5.   OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Venture Capital and Private Equity Fundraising, 1990 – 2002 
 
  Dependent Variable: Total Value of Fundraising from Institutional and Other Investors 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 2SLS  (4) 2SLS 
  OLS  OLS  Govt VC Endogenous  Govt VC Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                         
Constant  0.002223  4.531***  0.006801  5.716***  0.002035  4.203***  0.006688  5.364*** 
                         
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.015456  1.808*  0.015813  1.894*  0.014104  1.645  0.015226  1.819* 
                         
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  -0.00523  -1.082  -0.01086  -2.057**  -0.00407  -0.818  -0.00999  -1.856* 
                         
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  0.001519  2.642***  0.001722  3.355***  0.001593  2.764***  0.001752  3.383*** 
                         
Trend  0.000211  5.257***  0.00024  6.155***  0.00021  5.194***  0.00024  6.037*** 
                         
Self Employment / Population in Prior Year  -0.01423  -3.360***  -0.022  -3.939***  -0.01267  -2.758***  -0.02281  -3.792*** 
                         
Patents in Prior Year  -1.4E-08  -1.189  -3.5E-08  -2.568**  -1.3E-08  -1.072  -3.4E-08  -2.454** 
                         
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -2.96E-05  -2.976***  ---  ---  -2.9E-05  -2.923***  ---  --- 
                         
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (lower value is better)  ---  ---  -0.00258  -5.209***  ---  ---  -0.00255  -4.974*** 
                         
Government VC Programs  -0.00106  -5.127***  -0.00071  -3.788***  -0.00116  -5.615***  -0.0005  -2.338** 
                         
             
Number of Observations  195  195  195  195 
F Statistic  14.21***  20.86***  14.06***  20.14*** 
Loglikelihood  4987.957  5003.887  4987.548  5002.270 
Akaike Information Statistic  -51.066  -51.230  -51.062  -51.213 
Adjusted R
2  0.353  0.450  0.350  0.441 
             
 
Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5.  OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Venture Capital and Private Equity Fundraising, 1990 – 2002 (continued) 
 
   Dependent Variable: Fundraising, Excluding US Observations 
   (5)  (6)  (7) 2SLS  (8) 2SLS 
   OLS  OLS  Govt VC Endogenous  Govt VC Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                          
Constant  0.002673  5.246***  0.007163  6.260***  0.002387  4.825***  0.007023  5.877*** 
                          
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.016109  1.788*  0.016346  1.866*  0.014555  1.609  0.015773  1.794* 
                          
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  -0.0062  -1.269  -0.01052  -1.989**  -0.00454  -0.907  -0.00951  -1.762* 
                          
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  0.001245  2.184**  0.00143  2.853***  0.001322  2.301**  0.001457  2.869*** 
                          
Trend  0.000207  4.984***  0.00023  5.914***  0.000206  4.939***  0.000231  5.819*** 
                          
Self Employment / Population in Prior Year  -0.01604  -3.765***  -0.02231  -3.952***  -0.01419  -3.045***  -0.02307  -3.824*** 
                          
Patents in Prior Year  -5.9E-08  -1.105  -5.6E-09  -0.147  -4.1E-08  -0.768  4.85E-09  0.127 
                          
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -3.39E-05  -3.442***  ---  ---  -3.24E-05  -3.330***  ---  --- 
                          
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (lower value is better)  ---  ---  -0.00271  -5.545***  ---  ---  -0.00269  -5.310*** 
                          
Government VC Programs  -0.00112  -5.475***  -0.00071  -3.802***  -0.00117  -5.876***  -0.00046  -2.171** 
                          
              
Number of Observations  182  182  182  182 
F Statistic  12.88***  20.07***  12.59***   19.25*** 
Loglikelihood  4656.814  4674.035  4656.042  4672.224 
Akaike Information Statistic  -51.075  -51.264  -51.066  -51.244 
Adjusted R
2  0.344  0.457  0.339  0.447 
              
 
Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6.  OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Venture Capital and Private Equity Exits, 1990 - 2002 
 
   Dependent Variable: Total Value of All Dispositions 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 2SLS  (4) 2SLS 
   OLS  OLS  Govt VC Endogenous  Govt VC Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                          
Constant  0.000955  4.408***  0.002131  6.917***  0.000917  4.302***  0.002089  6.209*** 
                          
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.002568  1.222  0.002313  1.137  0.002239  1.063  0.002138  1.056 
                          
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  -0.00081  -0.271  -0.00183  -0.602  -0.00052  -0.168  -0.00158  -0.502 
                          
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  0.000315  1.233  0.000377  1.495  0.000337  1.321  0.000387  1.542 
                          
Trend  2.06E-05  1.476  2.98E-05  2.042**  2.03E-05  1.442  2.97E-05  1.985** 
                          
Self Employment / Population in Prior Year  -0.00188  -1.351  -0.00425  -2.538**  -0.00148  -0.995  -0.00436  -2.324** 
                          
Patents in Prior Year  5.35E-09  0.5  9.53E-10  0.09  5.65E-09  0.532  1.31E-09  0.124 
                          
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -1.3E-05  -4.290***  -2.4E-06  -0.63  -1.4E-05  -4.328***  -2.5E-06  -0.62 
                          
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (lower value is better)  ---  ---  -0.00072  -5.182***  ---  ---  -0.00071  -4.507*** 
                          
Government VC Programs  -0.00033  -4.453***  -0.00022  -2.778***  -0.00037  -4.846***  -0.00018  -1.905* 
                          
              
Number of Observations  195  195  195  195 
F Statistic  8.17***  8.71  8.17***  8.51*** 
Loglikelihood  5175.354  5180.442  5175.360  5179.774 
Akaike Information Statistic  -52.988  -53.030  -52.988  -53.023 
Adjusted R
2  0.228  0.265  0.228  0.258 
              
 
Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6.  OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Venture Capital and Private Equity Exits, 1990 – 2002 (continued) 
 
   Dependent Variable: Dispositions, Excluding US Observations 
   (5)  (6)  (7) 2SLS  (8) 2SLS 
   OLS  OLS  Govt VC Endogenous  Govt VC Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                          
Constant  0.001249  7.079***  0.002401  9.129***  0.001177  7.027***  0.002379  8.301*** 
                          
MSCI Public Market Return in the Prior Year  0.003237  1.674*  0.002838  1.587  0.002838  1.460  0.002631  1.483 
                          
Real GDP Growth in the Prior Year  -0.00104  -0.37  -0.00148  -0.526  -0.00055  -0.189  -0.00113  -0.385 
                          
Dummy Variable for Years 1999 and 2000  6.57E-05  0.506  0.000124  1.026  8.9E-05  0.673  0.000135  1.117 
                          
Trend  1.63E-05  1.161  2.43E-05  1.663*  1.59E-05  1.125  2.46E-05  1.639 
                          
Self Employment / Population in Prior Year  -0.00296  -2.313***  -0.00473  -3.038***  -0.00252  -1.903*  -0.00495  -2.927*** 
                          
Patents in Prior Year  -1.5E-08  -1.098  1.24E-08  0.851  -8.6E-09  -0.647  1.75E-08  1.216 
                          
Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -1.6E-05  -6.018***  -3E-06  -0.759  -1.6E-05  -5.930***  -2.4E-06  -0.561 
                          
EVCA Tax / Legal Index (lower value is better)  ---  ---  -0.0008  -5.230***  ---  ---  -0.00081  -4.725*** 
                          
Government VC Programs  -0.00037  -4.975***  -0.00022  -2.710***  -0.00038  -4.866***  -0.00016  -1.526 
                          
              
Number of Observations  182  182  182  182 
F Statistic  10.69***  13.35***  10.34***  12.68*** 
Loglikelihood  4894.815  4906.498  4893.831  4904.573 
Akaike Information Statistic  -53.690  -53.808  -53.679  -53.787 
Adjusted R
2  0.300  0.381  0.292  0.367 
              
 
Note:  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   36
This evidence on industry dispositions in Table 6 on the pronounced impact of 
law on venture finance is consistent with, and provides further support for, the 
evidence on the effect of law on investing (Tables 3 and 4) and fundraising 
(Table  5).  The  fact  that  industry-wide  dispositions  are  negatively  related  to 
government programs, harsh bankruptcy laws, and unfavourable EVCA legal 
indices, and the fact that these legal effects are much more robust in terms of 
greater economic and statistical significance relative to the economic variables, 
highlights the very pronounced role of law in facilitating Silicon Valley-like 
venture capital markets.   
 
6.4  Limitations and future research 
 
This  paper  makes  use  of  aggregate  annual  industry  data  across  15  nations 
spanning  13  years  (1990  –  2002).  There  are  limitations  with  the  use  of 
aggregate  data  in  terms  of  details  regarding  specific  micro-level  transaction 
effects. Transaction specific data could be used to explore certain issues raised 
in this paper in more detail. That type of analysis would be a useful extension 
and would complement the results presented herein. To assess overall industry 
effects resulting from the legal environment, however, it is necessary to employ 
a comprehensive set of data, and such data exist only on an aggregate basis. 
 
Whilst our indices for bankruptcy laws and public funds are true time series, the 
EVCA index of legal and fiscal measures was first constructed in 2003. Our 
preliminary consideration of a modified EVCA index with changes over time 
did not yield material changes to our econometric estimates. The main reason is 
that,  as  described  above  in  subsection  3.1,  the  EVCA  index  is  a  weighted 
average of 10 legal factors; therefore, legislative changes to a subset of the 
variables are relatively immaterial to the overall index value for a country year 
index value.
39 By contrast, our public VC funds variable and bankruptcy law 
index are not averaged values of multiple legal and institutional variables, and 
therefore we made use of our own variables which do in fact change over time 
for each of the countries considered in our sample. 
 
Our conclusions in this paper are of course confined to the countries considered.  
We did consider segregating the sample by dropping countries, but this did not 
materially affect our presented results. We presented all of the results with and 
without the U.S. data (as a natural suspect for an outlier country); alternative 
specifications are available upon request. As datasets become developed over a 
significantly lengthy period from other countries in developing nations, it would 
also be quite worthwhile to assess the role of legal systems in facilitating the 
development of more nascent venture capital markets.   
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Finally,  our  findings  as  to  the  impact  of  bankruptcy  law  pose  intriguing 
questions as to the relative importance of demand versus supply-side factors. 
Against  the  background  of  increasing  globalisation  of  financial  markets,  it 
might  be  thought  that  demand-side  factors  would  become  increasingly 
important vis-à-vis those that impact solely upon supply, as capital may move 
more easily across borders than entrepreneurs (Mayer, 2001; Armour, 2003). 
Whilst we find that the economic significance of bankruptcy law is much less 
than that of the composite index of supply-side legal measures, this does not 
provide a genuine test of the ‘demand-side hypothesis’, for in this study we 
consider only one demand-side factor, as against the full range of supply-side 
measures that industry experts consider to be important. Future research might 
investigate the relative significance of the EVCA index as against a similarly 
composite index of demand-side factors.  
7.  Implications and conclusion 
Based on aggregate industry venture capital and private equity data spanning 
the  period  1990  –  2002  from  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
UK,  and  the  US,  we  show  that  the  legal  environment  is  of  paramount 
importance  in  measuring  the  supply  of  and  demand  for  venture  capital.  
Favourable tax and legal environments facilitate the establishment of venture 
capital and private equity funds and increase the supply of capital. Similarly, 
temperate  bankruptcy  laws  stimulate  entrepreneurialism  and  increase  the 
demand  for  venture  capital.  Government  programs,  by  contrast,  crowd  out 
private equity investment. These effects are both statistically and economically 
significant,  and  more  pronounced  than  the  effects  from  control  variables 
pertaining  to  MSCI  returns,  real  GDP  growth,  patent  activity,  among  other 
controls explicitly shown and otherwise, including controls for the endogeneity 
of government programs. We showed further that these results were supported 
by  alternative  estimation  methods  and  an  analysis  of  fundraising  across 
countries. 
 
In the course of our complementary analyses, we demonstrated that industry 
dispositions  per  dollar  of  GDP  are  enhanced  by  favourable  tax  and  legal 
environments for funds, and by temperate bankruptcy laws for entrepreneurs. 
Government  programs,  by  contrast,  significantly  reduce  overall  industry 
dispositions per dollar of GDP. These results are robust to the endogeneity of 
the establishment of and support for government programs. 
 
What  implications  do  our  results  have,  both  for  our  understanding  of  the 
determinants of venture finance, and for policymakers seeking to replicate the   38
‘Silicon  Valley’  phenomenon  elsewhere?  The  prevailing  wisdom,  it  will  be 
recalled,
40 has been that deep and liquid stock markets are the most important 
determinant  of  venture  capital  investment.  Policymakers  wishing  to  foster 
venture capital markets could therefore do so indirectly by implementing legal 
measures that are ‘foundational’ for the development of liquid stock markets: 
disclosure laws, minority shareholder protection, antidirector rights, and so on 
(La Porta et al, 1997, 1998; Black, 2001). An alternative route would be for 
governments  to  supply  capital  themselves,  through  publicly  funded  schemes 
that would seek to ‘jump start’ private equity markets. This, however, would 
seem to be a risky use of public funds, the success of such schemes being highly 
contingent on the appropriate design of incentives (Gilson, 2003).   
 
It  appears  that  the  menu  for  policy-makers  seeking  to  replicate  a  ‘Silicon 
Valley’ type venture capital market contains more options than has previously 
been  imagined.  Our  results  suggest  that  a  range  of  legal  factors  may  affect 
venture  capital  investment  directly.  By  using  the  EVCA  legal  index,  which 
relates specifically to the factors that matter to venture capital investors, we are 
able to capture the significance of the most direct impacts made by the legal 
regime  on  investment  levels.  Not  only  are  these  relationships  statistically 
significant,  but  our  results  suggest  that  they  have  considerable  economic 
significance  as  well.  Policymakers  wishing  to  develop  VC  markets  might 
therefore consider modifying their fiscal and legal environment in accordance 
with the EVCA index, as an alternative, or in addition to, reforms designed to 
foster deep and liquid stock markets.  
 
Our  results  also  raise  further  doubts  about  the  wisdom  of  publicly  funded 
venture capital funds. Our findings on Hypothesis 2, namely that the presence of 
public  funds tend  to  reduce  overall  industry  returns,  and,  what  is  worse,  to 
‘crowd out’ private funds, suggest that most of these schemes have not been 
designed with appropriate incentives. At best, this implies that the ‘engineering 
problem’ for those designing such schemes is a difficult one. At worst, it may 
imply that the public sector’s openness to interest group capture means that it is 
inherently unsuited to acting in a role where very hard financial discipline is 
required. Either way, the implication of our results for policymakers is clear, 
confirming earlier suspicions: publicly funded venture schemes do not appear to 
have  been,  in  aggregate,  an  effective  way  of  stimulating  venture  capital 
investment.  
 
Our third finding is that a temperate personal bankruptcy law increases demand 
for VC finance, even controlling for other ‘demand-side’ factors such as patent 
activity  and  levels  of  self-employment.  On  one  level,  this  finding  is 
counterintuitive, given that venture capital is equity finance. However, the result   39
supports our theory, based on the idea that the process of seeking venture capital 
itself  is  costly  and  that  bankruptcy  law  thereby  affects  the  numbers  of 
entrepreneurs  willing  (marginal  entrepreneurs)  or  able  (inframarginal 
entrepreneurs) to incur these ‘pre-seed’ search costs. This is reinforced by the 
fact  that  the  correlation  is  statistically  more  significant  for  early-stage  than 
expansion stage finance amongst the subset of data excluding the US, consistent 
with the idea that personal bankruptcy law’s impact is disproportionately loaded 
onto  the  very  earliest  stages  of  entrepreneurial  activity.  The  finding  is  also 
consistent with existing research that has shown temperate personal bankruptcy 
law to be an important determinant of levels of entrepreneurship in general. The 
immediate  implication  for  policymakers  wishing  to  foster  national  venture 
capital markets is clear: it is possible for the legal environment to enhance not 
only the attractiveness of a jurisdiction for investors, but also the numbers of 
individuals willing to engage in entrepreneurial activity,
41 and one way to do 
this is to make bankruptcy laws less penal.   
 
At  a  more  general  level,  our  results  may  also  have  implications  for  our 
understanding  of  the  complementarities  between  venture  capital  and  other 
elements of financial systems. The dominant classification categorises financial 
systems as ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’, according to the ownership and governance 
structure of their public firms. The divide is correlated with the strength of the 
protection  afforded  to  shareholders  in  public  firms  (La  Porta  et  al,  1997). 
Following Black and Gilson (1998), venture capital activity is thought to be 
directly linked to stock markets, and thus map directly across this divide. Insider 
systems, this might imply, are not going to develop VC markets without stock 
markets. However, whilst the most attractive exit from a VC investment, namely 
an IPO, might be most readily available in an outsider system, the essence of the 
VC relationship whilst it subsists in fact owes more to the governance strategies 
employed by public company blockholders in insider systems (Allen and Song, 
2003).  The  relationship  involves  rich  flows  of  information  and  active 
governance activity. The fact that there are legal determinants of VC activity, 
which  are  independent  of,  and  not  correlated  with,  stock  market  activity, 
provides  further  support  for  the  view  that  venture  capital’s  position  is  not 
‘naturally’ situated in outsider governance regimes.  
 
Overall, the policy implications from the data indicate the road to establishing a 
Silicon  Valley-like  private  equity  market  outside  the  U.S.  is  paved  with 
favourable tax laws and legal structures that accommodate the establishment of 
private equity funds, temperate bankruptcy laws that provide little or no time to 
discharge  for  entrepreneurs, and  at  most  only  a  very  small  scope  for direct 




1  Practitioner summaries of public policy initiatives are available on links 
from www.evca.com (for Europe), www.ventureeconomics.com (for the 
US)  and  www.cvca.ca  (for  Canada).  Various  policy  initiatives  are 
summarized in Gilson (2003), Cressy (2002), Armour (2002, 2003), Cosh 
and Wood (1998), and Cumming (2003). 
 
2  For seminal studies, see Sahlman (1990); Black and Gilson (1998) and 
Gompers and Lerner (1999). The literature is reviewed by Klausner and 
Litvak (2001); Gompers and Lerner (2001) and Armour (2003). 
 
3  For example, see Poterba (1989a,b), Gompers and Lerner (1998), Lerner 
(1999, 2002a,b), Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001, 2003a,b).  
 
4    Specifically:  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
UK, and the US. 
 
5   That is, we divide the relevant figure by the same country’s GDP in the 
same year. 
 
6  We follow the terminology of the European Venture Capital Association 
(www.evca.com), and apply similar definitions to the U.S. and Canadian 
markets  (definitions  in  other  countries  may  vary).  Thus  ‘early  stage’ 
investment refers to investment in ‘idea’ type entrepreneurial companies 
without  positive  earnings,  ‘expansion  stage’  investment  refers  to 
investment in companies that could be earning profits but need significant 
capital  inflows  for  plant  expansion,  marketing,  and  to  initiate  product 
commercialization, and ‘total private equity’ include early and expansion 
stage venture capital, along with all other forms of private equity finance, 
such as late stage, buyout and turnaround investments. We study these 
venture capital and private equity sectors both together and separately in 
order  to  consider  explicitly  the  robustness  of  the  results  to  different 
definitions of venture capital and private equity. 
 
7   That is, governments may introduce or add to programs in response to 
low levels of venture capital and private equity in their country. 
 




9   The  ways  in  which  venture  capitalists  in  the  US,  UK  and  elsewhere 
overcome these agency problems by contracting and monitoring has been 
extensively studied empirically. See e.g. Sahlman (1990); Gompers and 
Lerner  (1999)  (US  venture  capitalists);  Reid  (1998)  (UK  venture 
capitalists);  and  Cumming  (2002)  (European  venture  capitalists, 
excluding the UK). 
 
10  Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Tykvová (2000) provide evidence that 
venture capital is disproportionately linked to innovative activity in the 
US and Germany respectively; see also Lerner (2002b), and Lerner et al. 
(2002). 
 
11  Requiring regular interest payments and the use of collateral are ways in 
which lenders can overcome the problems stemming from the fact that 
entrepreneurs have private information about the quality of their projects 
and about the way in which they are being carried out. See e.g. Hart 
(1995); Berger and Udell (1998). 
 
12  The ‘arm’s length’ vs. ‘relationship’ finance terminology is taken from 
Rajan (1992).  
 
13  Other studies suggest that differences in corporate and tax law may result 
in differences in transaction structure, but not necessarily affect overall 
investment levels (Gilson and Schizer, 2003; Lerner and Schoar, 2003). 
 
14  Crucial to the success of private venture funds is the use of appropriate 
contractual technology, both in the design of financial instruments so as 
to minimise agency costs in the portfolio company-VC relationship, but 
also  at  the  logically  prior  stage  of  the  covenants  granted  by  general 
partners  in  VC  funds  to  their  investors.  These  ensure  that  the  VCs 
themselves are appropriately incentivised to select good investments and 
to keep up their monitoring efforts so as to ensure that the maximum 
return is achieved on them in due course (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999; Gilson, 2003). 
 
15   The poor design of fund manager incentives, owing to mandatory rules, 
may, it appears, have similarly affected returns in UK (Cumming, 2003) 
and  Canadian  publicly  funded  schemes  (Cumming  and  MacIntosh, 
2003b). 
 
16  The authors are indebted to Ralph Winter for this suggestion.    
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17  Although many end-investors (e.g. US pension funds) are tax-exempt, a 
significant proportion are taxable (see e.g. Gomper and Lerner, 1998). 
 
18    This  could  happen  if,  for  example,  the  governance  of  such  funds  is 
mandated  by  the  relevant  legislation,  as  opposed  to  being  agreed  by 
contract as with private funds. The covenants agreed by private venture 
funds are capable of being customised to suit different circumstances, and 
of evolving over time. These attributes are not shared by mandatory rules 
prescribed by legislation.  
 
19  Leleux and Surlemount (2003), by contrast, do not find crowding out in a 
study of investment data from 15 European countries in the early 90s. 
Leleux  and  Surlemount  argue  that  their  results  support  the  view  that 
public  funds  ‘signal’  the  state’s  commitment  to  support  the  venture 
capital industry, and therefore encourage private investment. Leleux and 
Surlemount’s dataset, however, comprises the period 1990-1996, and it is 
therefore worthwhile to explore this issue further over at least one full 
business cycle. 
 
20  Jeng and Wells (2000) consider that bankruptcy law is likely to be an 
important  legal  determinant  of  venture  capital  investment,  but  do  not 
outline a theory and do not test for links, citing lack of legal data on 
relevant bankruptcy laws. 
 
21  This  can  be  understood  as  a  response  to  a  collective  action  problem 
(Jackson,  1982).  When  a  debtor  becomes  insolvent,  creditors  have 
incentives to engage in a ‘run on the bank’, enforcing their individual 
claims as quickly as possible, even if this results in a reduced overall 
value  being  obtained  for  the  debtor’s  assets.  Bankruptcy  law,  by 
providing  a  mandatory  collective  process,  removes  the  incentives  to 
engage in such a wasteful ‘race’. That said, many of the difficulties may 
be solved by private contracting in advance—for example, through the 
use  of  appropriately  structured  secured  credit  agreements.  These  and 
other aspects of bankruptcy law theory are reviewed in Armour (2001). 
 
22  In  almost  all  jurisdictions,  a  debtor  may  emerge  from  bankruptcy  by 
entering into a ‘composition’ with his creditors, whereby he agrees to 
repay a proportion of the face value of his debts and the rest is treated as 
discharged. The difference between this and the ‘fresh start’ discussed in 
the  text  is,  however,  that  a  composition  requires  the  agreement  of  a  
  43
 
majority of the debtor’s creditors. A ‘fresh start’ regime on the other hand 
entitles the debtor to be discharged against the wishes of creditors. 
 
23  Another  route  is  to  obtain  finance  from  a  ‘business  angel’,  that  is,  a 
former entrepreneur who assists others by providing pre-seed funding. 
However, this is not a universal phenomenon. In many cases, would-be 
entrepreneurs  do  not  have  access  to  ‘angel’  networks.  In  others,  the 
angels may engage in such sophisticated screening that the entrepreneur 
will  need  to  spend  similar  amounts  on  ‘pre-seed’  as  if  they  had 
approached a VC directly. 
 
24  Or if venture capital is raised and the business subsequently fails: simply 
because venture  capital  is  invested in the  business  does not mean  the 
entrepreneur’s personal finances will have been restored to their previous 
position.   
 
25  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  at  least  some  portion  of  ‘start-up’ 
entrepreneurs rely on credit card borrowing in order to finance the ‘pre-
seed’ stage. See e.g. Tim Huber, ‘Building a House of (Credit) Cards: 
credit cards finance the growth of small business startups’, Minneapolis-
St.  Paul  Business  Journal  7  October  1996;  Rodney  Ho,  ‘Investor 
Finances His Dream with Plastic’, WSJ.com Startup Journal 1 May 1999 
(www.startupjournal.com/financing/trends/199905011027-ho.html); 
Matthew Pfeffer, ‘Entrepreneur Profile: Dave McClure’, Startup Failures 
(http://www.startupfailures.com/Feature_stories/EProfile_Dave_McClure
.htm); Jill Andresky Fraser, ‘It’s Not Just for Credit Cards Anymore’, 
Inc.com  April  2002;  Kate  Milani,  ‘Startups  Often  Say  Charge  It’, 
Baltimore Business Journal 2 August 2003. 
 
26  Making bankruptcy less unpleasant for debtors also has an adverse impact 
on the supply of credit to small businesses (Berkowitz and White, 2002), 
but it appears that this is dominated by the demand effect (Fan and White, 
2002; Berkowitz and White, 2002; cf. Georgellis and Wall, 2002). 
 
27   Existing studies (Fan and White, 2002; Georgellis and Wall, 2002) have 
focused on cross-state comparisons within the US, where a ‘fresh start’ is 
uniformly available under Federal law as soon as the proceedings have 
finished. 
 




29   20%  is  used  because  it  is  considered  to  be  a  pronounced  level  of 
government  support  in  EVCA  practitioner  discussions  (see 
www.evca.com). We considered other “cut-off” points other than 20%. 
Notably, a cut-off level of only 5% government support is associated with 
a much smaller material affect on the VC industry in a country. 
 
30  As  discussed  herein,  the  results  are  quite  robust  to  alternative 
specifications.  Some  robustness  checks  are  provided  in  the  tables; 
alternative specifications not reported are available upon request. 
 
31  The only exceptions where this variable is considered exogenous is in 
models 1, 2, 5 and 6 in Tables 5 and 6, where the exogenous specification 
is  provided  to  illustrate  robustness  alongside  the  specification  that 
accounts for the potential bias that is associated with endogeneity. 
 
32  Legal data on personal bankruptcy laws are set out in Armour (2002). 
 
33  The figure used is national life expectancy minus 30 years, to simulate 
the impact on a relatively young entrepreneur. The results are robust to 
alternative specifications. 
 
34  When the government variable is defined at the 5% cut-off point, the 
coefficient  is  insignificant  (as  the  other  variables  do  not  materially 
change). See also supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 
35  Gompers and Lerner (1998) employ U.S. fund-specific data while Jeng 
and  Wells  (2000)  use  industry-wide  data  across  countries.    See  also 
Cumming  et  al.  (2004)  for  a  fund-specific  analysis  of  fundraising  in 
Australia. Our approach is more similar to that used by Jeng and Wells, 
as we also make use of cross-country industry-wide data. Cross-country 
fund-specific data  are generally  unavailable  (as the details  in the data 
differ  across  countries),  and  fund-specific  datasets  within  any  given 
country do not provide 100% coverage of all funds. Our interest is in an 
industry-wide analysis of fundraising across countries. 
 
36  Note  that  regressions  (3)  and  (4)  and  (7)  and  (8)  show  that  the 
significance of the EVCA tax and legal index and the government VC 
program variable depend on the inclusion of both simultaneously when 
2SLS is used (unlike the OLS estimates). It is for this reason that the 




37  A finding of no crowding out would require the government variable to 
be positive and significant. When the government variable is specified as 
a dummy equal to one at the level of 5% of the market (instead of the 
reported specification of 20% of the market), the estimated coefficient is 
statistically insignificant (instead of negative and significant); see also 
supra notes 22 and 27. 
 
38  The results are also quite robust to the different instruments, including 
country  dummy  variables  to  pick  up  political  incentives  to  set-up 
government  funds,  as  well  as  the  EVCA  index  (countries  with 
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39  An absence in time variation in a legal index is of course shared with all 
studies  that  employ  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997,  1998)  legality  variables  in 
relation  to  time  series  financial  data.  We  did  not  employ  a  modified 
EVCA index, mainly because the weighting and rankings across each of 
the 10 factors that comprise the EVCA index involves some subjectivity 
(unlike our bankruptcy index and public funds indicator variables). 
 
40  See supra section 2.2. 
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